4-15 

•  9 
-F8P3 


REPLY  OF  LIEUT.-COL  PILSEN 


TO 


EMIL    SCHALKS    CRITICISMS 


OF 


THE   CAMPAIGN   IN   THE   MOUNTAIN  DEPART 
MENT,  UNDER 

MAJ.-GEN.  J,  C.  FREMONT. 


Bancroft  Library 


YORK,  June,  1863. 
To  Mr.  EMIL  SCHALK, 

Author  of  "  Summary  of  the  Art  of  War :" 
Sir, — Before  writing  a  book  which  pretends  to  the  dignity  of 
history,  an  author  is  bound  to  exercise  the  closest  scrutiny  in 
discovering  the  truth.  A  single  page  not  founded  in  verity, 
may  be  the  source  of  infinite  harm,  and  ought,  as  it  does,  to 
discredit  the  whole  book,  especially  when  it  assumes  the  char 
acter  of  a  severe  criticism,  directed,  not  only  to  tarnish  the 
glory  of  the  nation  and  the  bravery  of  our  soldiers,  but  to 
injure  the  reputation  of  living  persons  in  stations  of  trust, 
whose  honor  is  identified  with  the  national  well-being.  Such 
is  the  case  with  the  Second  Yolume  of  your  work  on  the  Art  of 
War,  discussing  the  Campaigns  of  1862-1863. 

I  am  aware  that  you  preface  this  discussion  by  the  admission 
that  many  of  your  statements  may  be  incorrect,  but  that  such 
errors  do  not  affect  the  truth  of  the  application  of  the  great 
principles  of  the  art  of  war. 

I  deny  this  proposition  altogether  in  so  far  as  your  attempt  to  • 
criticise  the  conduct  of  the  campaign  of  '62  and  '63,  and  there 
could  not  be  presented  a  better  evidence  of  the  absurdity  of 
trying  to  reason  out  correct  results  where  the  foundation  is 
false,  than  in  your-  criticisms  of  the  campaign  in  the  Mountain 
Department  under  the  command  of  Genl.  Fremont. 

There,  to  my  surprise,  I  noticed  a  presentation  of  the  battle 
of  Cross  Keys,  which  not  only  has  not  any  foundation  in  fact, 
but  perverts  and  mutilates  so  utterly  the  whole  transaction,  that 
the  full  weight  of  my  introductory  remarks  is  not  a  sufficient 
measure  of  your  culpability. 

As  I  took  active  part  in  that  battle,  in  the  capacity  of  a  Chief 
of  Artillery,  and  can  bear  testimony  with  full  knowledge  in  tl.e 
premises,  I  undertake  to  enter  into  a  discussion  upon  this  sub 
ject,  and  to  give  you  the  opportunity  to  do  that  campaign,  it.s 

\~A\5 


leader,  and  yourself,  justice  before  the  world.  On  tiie  pages 
102  and  101  of  the  above-named  book,  you  chose  to  describe 
that  action  in  the  following  terms  : 

"  Genl.  Fremont,  who  had  arrived  meanwhile  at  Harrisonburg,  on  re  | 
eeiving  the  intelligence  that  Jackson  was  crossing  the  Sheuandoah  at  i  \ 
place  called  Port  Republic,  moved  his  army  in  the  direction  of  Port  Re- 1 
public,  but  was  stopped   at  Cross  Keys,  a  place  about  half  way  from  his 
destination,  by  the  rear  guard  of  the  Rebels,  about  5,000  strong,  drawn 
up  in  line  of  battle,  to  cover  the  crossing  of  their  train  and  main  body 
over  the  Shenandoah.     General  Fremont  attacked  their  position   with  ' 
20,000  men,  but  without  ensemble,  and  got  beaten  in  detail.  f 

"  While  his  rear-guard  was  beating  Fremont,  Jackson,  who  had  already! 
crossed  with  his  main  body,  found  himself  opposed    by  Genl.  Tyler,  of 
Genl.  Shields'  division,  who  was  sent  from  Lauray  to  Waynesborough,  to 
intercept  him  or  prevent  him  crossing.     Genl.  Tyler  paid  dearly  for  this 
attempt,"  etc.,  etc. 

First. — The  field  return  of  our  command  for  the  1st  of  June, 
near  Strasburg,  a  week  before  the  battle  of  Cross  Keys,  gives: 

Total  of  officers  present  for  duty 641 

"        enlisted  men     "  1 1,031 


Total 11,672 

This  return  being  made  up  from  date,  "  near  Strasbourg," 
was,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  march,  considerably  re 
duced  by  the  loss,  from  all  causes,  between  that  date  and  the 
Cross  Keys'  battle,  June  8th.  When  therefore  we  say  that  the 
actual  strength  of  our  forces  in  that  battle  did  not  amount  to 
more  than  ten  thousand  five  hundred  (10,500)  men,  we  give 
quite  as  high  a  number  as  the  returns  justify.  This  official 
document  is  a  sufficient  evidence  against  your  statement. 

Second. — In  reference  to  Jackson's  forces,  we  were  fully  in 
formed  from  prisoners  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  and 
our  own  spies,  that  they  numbered  more  than  22,000  men.  The 
current  report  of  the  country  through  which  both  corps  passed, 
put  Jackson's  at  25,000  men.  Two  of  our  scouts,  taken  prison, 
ers  at  Port  Republic,  severally  reported  the  force  on  his  rolls  at 


31,000  men.  There  are,  besides,  telegraphic  despatches,  show 
ing  that  Jackson's  force  at  Orange  Court  House,  on  his  march 
from  Port  Kepublic  to  Richmond,  was  over  40,000  men. 
Jackson  overestimated  our  force.  He  erroneously  supposed  us 
18,000  men  strong,  and  this,  in  connection  with  the  fact  that  he 
believed  us  united  with  a  portion  of  McDowell's  corps,  may 
explain  his  hasty  retreat  before  us. 

Information  verifying  our  conjectures  at  the  time  in  regard 
both  to  this  intended  attack,  our  estimate  of  numbers,  and  other 
interesting  points,  was  lately  obtained  by  a  Federal  officer 
taken  prisoner  by  Jackson's  corps  at  Chancellorsville,  who, 
having  been  with  us  at  Cross  Keys,  talked  over  that  battle  with 
officers  of  Jackson's  staff. 

At  Harrisonburg,  Longstreet  had  already  effected  a  junction 
with  Jackson,  and  it  was  by  his  positive  order  that  Jackson  was 
prevented  from  attacking  Fremont  in  the  night  of  the  sixth 
(6th)  at  Harrisonburg,  he  having  decided  to  do  so  at  eleven  at 
night.  So  that  in  the  engagements  about  Port  Eepublic,  the 
troops  of  both  Longstreet  and  Jackson  undoubtedly  took  part. 

Third. — That  we  had  met  at  Cross  Keys  only  the  rear-guard 
of  the  rebels,  5,000  men  strong,  you  evidently  deduce  from  the 
assertion,  that  his  main  body  in  the  same  time  was  busy  with 
crossing  the  Shenandoah  and  fighting  Gen.  Tyler's  forces. 
This  assertion,  however,  sir,  with  all  deference,  is  a  false  one. 
No  engagement  between  Jackson's  main  body  and  Gen.  Tyler 
took  place  on  this  day  ;  but  the  fact  is,  that  Col.  Carroll,  of 
Shields'  division,  in  the  morning  of  this  very  day,  reached  Port 
Eepublic  with  a  small  body,  and  found  no  rebels  there  in  force 
occupied  with  crossing  or  protecting  the  bridge.  That  the 
bridge  was  not  destroyed,  does  not  belong  to  our  account,  and 
may  be  attributed  to  Carroll's  expectation  that  this  bridge 
would  serve  later  as  a  good  medium  for  throwing  over  Shields' 
division,  and  effecting  the  long  expected  union  with  our  forces. 
It  is  further  true,  that  Jackson  had  notice  of  the  threatening 
movement  of  Col.  Carroll,  and  that  in  time  he  detached  eight 
regiments  cavalry  and  infantry,  and  one  battery,  to  protect  the 
bridge.  This  body  occupied  on  the  same  day  Port  Republic, 
but  had  not  any  engagement  with  Federal  troops,  as  Col. 


Carroll,  considering  himself  too  weak,  fell  back  for  some  dis 
tance  upon  the  approaching  brigade  of  Gen.  Tyler.  With  the 
exception  of  those  eight  regiments  and  one  battery,  all  of  Jack 
son's  forces  were  left  at  Cross  Keys,  to  check  there  our  farther 
progress. 

To  any  man,  who  understands  something  of  war,  the  exten 
sion  of  the  enemy's  line  of  battle,  amounting  to  nearly  two 
miles,  the  number  of  his  guns  and  the  heavy  masses,  which  we 
found  opposed  to  us  at  every  point,  and  principally  on  his 
right  wing,  must  have  carried  the  conviction  that  we  had  not 
engaged  a  rear-guard  of  5,000  men,  but  an  enemy  superior  to 
our  numbers. 

Such  being  the  case,  I  cannot  omit  to  observe,  that  the  battle 
of  Cross  Keys  in  reality  was  very  different  from  the  appearance 
you  have  given  it  in  the  abusing  lines  of  your  book,  which  pre 
sents  a  total  perversion  of  the  real  facts. 

Let  us  now  inquire  into  the  correctness  of  your  further  asser 
tion,  that  we  attacked  without  ensemble. 

The  attack  was  prepared,  before  the  enemy  was  discovered  in 
position,  from  a  point  where  the  road  leading  to  Port  Republic 
divided  into  two  branches.  Without  having  either  county 
maps,  or  guides,  or  knowledge  of  the  ground,  knowing  only  the 
vicinity,  and  supposing  the  probable  position  of  the  enemy,  the 
whole  command,  without  hesitation  or  delay,  was  formed  into 
two  nearly  equally  strong  columns,  which  entered  upon  the 
two  branches.  So  we  followed  rather  our  own  impression,  and 
the  supposition  proved  itself  correct.  When  the  enemy  soon 
after  was  discovered,  we  had  the  advantage  of  being  able  to 
deploy  both  columns  at  once,  and  had  in  a  very  admirably  short 
time  a  well  combined  line  of  battle  in  the  whole  extent  of  the 
enemy's  position.  Every  other  manoeuvre  would  have  cost 
more  time,  and  proved  itself,  perhaps,  disastrous.  The  enemy? 
indeed,  expected  that  we  would  follow  the  main  road,  and  over 
look  the  side  road,  for  therealong  he  held  concealed  his  left 
wing,  pushed  forward  with  the  undoubted  intention  to  take  us* 
in  the  flank,  and  perhaps  seize  our  line  of  operation.  This,  of 
.course,  was  prevented  by  our  manoauvre,  and  the  enemy's  left 
wing  driven  in. 

As  it  was  supposed  by  the  formation  of  the  roads,  and  by  the 


understood  direction  of  the  bridge  of  Port  Republic,  that  the 
right  wing  of  the  enemy  was  his  strategical  flank,  we  accord 
ingly  gave  to  our  left  wing  the  strength  of  three  brigades,  while 
the  three  other  brigades  of  the  command  had  to  fill  out  the 
centre  and  the  right  wing.     The  plan  was  to  press  in  the  strate 
gical  flank  of  the  enemy  and  seize  his  road  of  retreat.     Two 
brigades  of  the  German  division  were  trusted  with  the  settlement 
of  this  problem,  and  had  a  third  brigade  of  the  same  division 
as  reserve  in  their  immediate  rear.     For  the  same  purpose  the 
brigade  of  our  right  formed  an  echellon  somewhat  backwards, 
and  was  so  posted  that  its  weight  could  be  thrown  in  another 
direction,  according  to  circumstances.   While  our  left  wing  was 
ordered  to  attack,  the  centre  and  the  right  had  to  watch  the 
progress,  and  to  act  accordingly.     So  the   battle  was  fought 
with  four  brigades  in  line  of  battle  in  immediate  action,  one 
brigade  on  the  right  in  a  somewhat  backward  echellon  partici 
pating  according  to  circumstances,  but  being  at  hand  for  further 
disposal,  and  one  brigade  as  reserve  in  the  immediate  rear  of 
the  left  wing.     "We  had  ten  batteries,  of  which  eight  and  a  half, 
in  the  short  time  of  less  than  thirty  minutes,  were  brought  into 
favorable  positions  in  the  immediate  face  of  the  enemy,  although 
he  was  posted  in  the  woods  greatly  to  our  disadvantage,  and  we 
were  compelled  to  go  in  search  of  his  precise  position,  often 
coming  upon  him  in  very  close  quarters.     When  I  now  add  to 
the  tactical  dispositions  above  described,  that  our  line  of  battle 
was  perpendicularly  based  upon  our  line  of  operation  ;  that  it 
remained  so  throughout  the  whole  action;  that  it  was  perfectly 
correct  in  reference  to  connection  and  formation ;  that  we  com 
manded  every  approach  to  our  flanks  and  our  rear,  and  that 
during  and  after  the  battle  we  were  in  the  full  attitude  of  the 
offensive, — I  ask  you  whether  supposition,  plan  and  disposition 
in  that  battle  were  with  or  without  ensemble  /  and  further  ask, 
how  much  better  you,  or  any  other  one  pretending  to  illustrate 
the  principles  of  the  art  of  war,  would  have  probably  acted  in 
the  premises  ? 

There  is  now  the  question  to  be  settled,  whether  we  got  beaten 
in  detail. 

As  no  judgment  upon  the  result  of  a  battle  can  be  made  by 
single  incidents  on  the  battle-field,  however  some   regiments 


6 

may  have  been  beaten  or  repulsed,  and  as  such  a  judgment  can 
be  passed  only  by  taking  into  consideration  the  whole  of  the 
event,  I  will  briefly  sum  up  the  result  of  this  day's  fighting. 

Col.  Cluseret,  who  had  the  advance,  took  the  centre  and  drove 
the  enemy  some  two  miles  from  their  original  position.  Sup 
porting  the  centre  came  General  Milroy,  who,  in  connection 
with  our  right  formed  by  General  Schenck,  had  pursued  the 
enemy's  left  wing  for  nearly  the  same  distance,  while  our  left 
wing,  under  Generals  Stahel  and  Bohlen,  after  having  advanced 
in  their  attack  for  about  a  mile,  was  in  its  turn  compelled  to 
retreat  for  about  this  distance,  and  did  not  retain  the  advantage 
it  had  gained.  The  rebels,  foreseeing  our  intention  to  press  in 
their  strategical  flank,  strengthened  their  right  wing  and  direct 
ed  their  principal  energies  upon  that  point ;  but  while  they 
succeeded  in  repulsing  the  brunt  of  our  left  wing  by  superior 
forces  and  the  most  favorable  position,  this  advantage  could  not 
counterbalance  the  success  of  our  centre  and  right,  which,  how 
ever  slowly,  still  steadily  advanced  and  could  not  be  stopped, 
while  the  enemy,  in  his  attempt  to  pursue  our  left  wing,  as  soon 
as  he  deployed  out  of  the  woods,  was  so  badly  treated  by  our 
artillery  that  be  hurried  back  again  into  his  woods  with  heavy 
loss. 

This,  sir,  is  the  real  result  of  the  battle  of  Cross  Iveys,  and 
no  man  can  say  that  our  forces  were  beaten  either  in  detail  or 
in  the  whole. 

General  Fremont  intended  to  make  another  general  attack, 
but  despatches  were  received  from  General  Shields,  containing 
the  intelligence,  that  he  had  sent  forward  Col.  Carroll  to  burn 
the  bridge  at  Port  Republic,  and  that  his  forces  were  already  at 
that  place.  As  it  was  well  understood  that  Jackson  could  not 
escape  under  such  circumstances,  and  that  the  burning  of  the 
bridge  would  produce  a  decisive  battle,  for  which  there  was  no 
more  time,  as  the  day  was  in  the  decline,  the  second  general 
attack  for  this  day  was  suspended,  a  strong  position  taken,  the 
necessary  rest  given  to  the  men,  and  every  preparation  made 
for  the  decisive  battle,  which  was  anticipated  for  the  next  morn 
ing.  Unfortunately,  as  I  mentioned  in  another  place,  Colonel 
Carroll  did  not  burn  the  bridge,  and  this  gave  a  fair  opportunity 
to  General  Jackson  to  save  his  forces  from  their  dangerous  posi- 


tion.  The  hasty  and  stealthy  manner  in  which  he  withdrew  during 
that  night  (the  8th)  would  seem  to  indicate  that  the  vigor  and  de 
termination  with  which  General  Fremont  pursued  ami  attacked 
him  had  a  great  moral  effect  upon  his  division. 

The  morning  after  the  battle  of  Cross  Keys,  General  Fremont's 
corps  moved  towards  the  Port  Republic  bridge,  maintaining  an 
admirable  order  of  battle,  and  advancing  with  great  steadiness 
and  rapidity.  A  column  of  smoke  arising  in  the  direction  of 
Port  Eepublic  indicated  that  the  bridge  had  been  fired,  but 
whether  by  Carroll  or  Jackson,  it  was  impossible  to  learn.  Our 
corps  had  proceeded  but  one  or  two  miles,  when  the  sound  of 
cannon  showed  that  the  federal  forces  on  the  other  side  and 
Jackson  were  engaged  at  or  near  the  bridge.  Pressing  forward 
in  the  most  brilliant  manner,  our  troops  reached  the  Shenan- 
doali,  but  only  to  find  Jackson  safely  across,  the  bridge  destroy 
ed,  and  the  federal  forces  on  the  other  side  defeatedjnnjyjy-Jfc 

The  building  of  a  bridge  was  immediately  begun,  a  reconnQi- 
tering  party  was  sent  out  to  ascertain  the  whereabouts  of  Shields7 
forces,  and  preparations  made  to  renew  the  pursuit  the  next  day. 
To  the  surprise  of  every  one,  however,  Captain  Haskel,  who  had 
been  sent  across  the  river  with  the  reconnoitering  party,  re 
turned  with  information,  that  General  Shields  had  been  ordered 
to  leave  the  Lauray  Valley,  and  was  then  oa  the  march  towards 
Fredericksburg.  This  left  General  Fremont's  left  flank  entirely 
exposed,  rendered  it  utterly  impossible  to  pursue  Jackson  farther 
with  his  small  force,  and  left  him  no  option  bnt  to  return  to 
Harrisonburg.  At  that  point  a  telegram,  sent  before  the  battle 
of  Cross  Keys,  reached  the  General,  instructing  him  to  cease  his 
pursuit  of  Jackson  at  that  place,  and  strengthen  himself  against 
an  attack.  It  was  found,  however,  that  the  forces  of  Generals 
Banks  and  Sigel  were  not  to  move  above  Strasburg.  Harrison- 
burg,  however  strong  its  position  may  be  strategically  for  a  large 
army,  is  dangerous  in  the  extreme  for  a  small  force.  Approach 
able  by  nine  different  road?,  there  is  constant  danger  of  being 
cut  off,  or  having  tlie  lines  of  communication  broken.  The 
opinions  of  Generals  Fremont,  Banks,  and  Sigel  coincided  as  to 
the  necessity  of  a  further  withdrawal.  These  opinions  being 
communicated  to  the  President,  he  signified  his  acquiescence 
in  the  movement,  and  General  Fremont  took  position  first 


at  Mount  Jackson,  and  afterwards  effected  a  junction  with 
Banks  and  Sigel  at  Middletown,  at  which  place  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  28th  of  June,  he  asked  to  be  relieved  from  command,  in 
consequence  of  General  Pope's  nomination  to  the  command  of 
the  army  of  Virginia. 

This,  sir,  is  the  true  version  of  the  battle  of  Cross  Keys  and 
of  the  next  subsequent  events. 

What  Jackson's  own  idea  of  his  situation  was,  is  very  plainly 
shown  by  the  following  extract  from  the  statements  of  Captain 
C.  JST.  Gould  ing,  who  was  General  Pope's  chief  quartermaster 
in  the  field,  and  who  was  taken  prisoner  upon  the  occasion  of 
Stuart's  noted  raid  at  Catlett's  station : 

"  Captain  Goulding  had  several  interviews  with  Jackson,  and  formed  a 
high  estimate  of  his  capabilities.  Jackson  told  him  that  during  the  entire 
war  he  had  never  been  so  hard  pressed  as  he  was  by  Fremont  in  the  She- 
nandoah  Valley ;  that  he  never  was  in  such  a  dangerous  position  as  at  Cross 
Keys  and  Port  Republic ;  and  he  freely  admitted  that  he  would  have  been 
captured,  army,  bag  and  baggage,  had  Fremont  been  reinforced  or  sup 
ported  by  McDowell." 

As  I  hope  to  have  sufficiently  demonstrated  by  the  above  re 
cital  the  ignorance  with  which  you  have  described  and  ad 
judicated  the  battle  of  Cross  Keys,  wre  will  turn  to  those  pages 
of  your  "  so-called  "  history,  where  you  do  your  utmost  in  com 
menting  upon  the  Shenandoah  Valley  campaign,  considered 
under  strategetical  principles. 

You  say  on  the  pages  176  and  177 : 

"The  direction  chosen  by  the  corps  of  Fremont  and  McDowell, for  the 
intercepting  of  Jackson,  was  a  wrong  one.  To  march  to  the  place  where 
Jackson  had  only  been  heard  of,  according  to  the  last  accounts,  was  evident 
ly  coming  too  late.  To  effect  the  object,  a  very  simple  exercise  of  arith 
metic  would  have  shown  where  to  march  to.  From  Winchester,  where 
Jackson  was,  on  the  25th,  to  Harrisonsburg,  in  the  Shenandoah  valley,  is 
three  days' march  ;  from  Franklin,  where  Fremont  was,  two;  and  from 
Falmouth,  where  McDowell's  corps  camped,  three  forced  or  four  ordinary 
days'  march.  Both  Union  Generals  might  have'gained  certainly  one,  and 
McDowell  easily  two  days'  march  on  Jackson,  who  could  not  have  been 
immediately  informed  of  their  movements.  Hence,  if  General  McDowel 
had  marched  to  Stannardsville,  and  thence  through  Swiss  Run  Gap  to 
Lauray,  occupying  Chester  Gap  and  the  road  to  New  Market,  Jackson 


9 

could  not  Lave  hindered  him  from  doing  so  ;  if,  at  the  same  time,  he  had 
pushed  a  column  from  Warren  ton  to  Manassas  Gap,  which  could  easily 
have  been  occupied  and  held  by  a  small  force,  he  might  have  been  in  those 
places  on  the  fourth  day,  and  formed  by  his  left  wing  a  junction  with  Gen. 
Fremont,  marching  from  Franklin  to  Harrisonsburg,  and  moving  thence 
upon  Broadway  and  New  Market.  Both  Generals,  pushing  rapidly  for 
ward  and  throwing  out  cavalry,  to  the  right  and  the  left,  near  the  gaps,  to 
remain  well  informed  of  Jackson's  movements,  might  have  been  in  this 
position  on  the  fourth  day.  And,  supposing  they  had  gained  only  one  day 
on  Jackson,  he  could  not  have  prevented  them.  It  will  be  seen,  that  by 
acting  in.this  way,  they  might,  with  their  main  force,  have  continually  pre 
vented  Jackson  returning  South,  whatever  course  he  might  take,  as  they 
could  always  reach  the  decisive  point  before  him.  iThat  point  would  have 
been  evidently  the  spot  to  the  right  or  left,  where  Jackson  tried  to  pass  them. 
That  they  would  have  gained  several  marches  on  him,  is  well  proved  by 
the  fact,  that  at  the  commencement  of  June,  he  was  still  at  Strasburg, 
and  on  the  seventh  only  at  Port  Republic,  at  which  place,  or  somewhat 
below,  the  Union  Generals  might  have  been  by  the  29th  of  May,  etc.,  etc." 

In  reading  these  lines,  I  felt  so  impressed  with  their  ab 
surdity,  that  you  must  excuse  me  if  here  and  there  some 
expressions  of  good-humored  contempt  intermix  with  more 
serious  reflections.  Let  me  try,  before  all,  to  place  you  on  the 
correct  point  of  view  from  which  you  would  have  judged  this 
campaign,  if  better  acquainted  with  the  situation.  A  consist 
ent  simple  exercise  of  arithmetic,  as  you  are  in  the  habit  of 
making,  will  serve  to  exhibit  our  condition.  Our  depot  of 
supplies  was  New  Creek,  eighty  (80)  miles,  say  five  stations, 
from  Franklin.  We  had  at  command  about  three  hundred 
wagons,  which,  divided  into  the  whole  way  to  New  Creek  and 
back,  shows  thirty  wagons  arriving  daily  at  Franklin.  It  may 
give  you  a  pleasure  to  calculate,  that  thirty  wagons  freight 
furnish  nearly  about  a  daily  ration  for  an  army  of  about  14,000 
men,  which  then  was  the  number  of  our  corps.  So  provided, 
we  could  have  lived  without  any  apprehension,  from  day  to  day, 
and  perhaps  we  might  even  have  succeeded  in  accumulating 
some  provisions  for  extraordinary  occasions,  if  at  the  same  time 
we  had  commanded  the  elements,  and  if  those  thirty  wagons 
could  have  been  used  only  for  the  transportation  of  rations. 
Unfortunately,  the  most  unfavorable  weather,  and  therefore  the 
worst  condition  of  roads,  embarrassed  the  forwarding  of  the 


10 

vehicles,  and  the  army  corps,  just  newly  gathered  together, 
wanted  very  many  other  things  besides  provisions.  Tims  our 
transportation  could  furnish  only  half  a  ration  daily,  and 
we  had  to  subsist  upon  fresh  beef  alone,  bread  or  crackers 
being  a  precious  luxury.  A  malignant  disposition  would 
discover,  in  this  circumstance,  a  theme  for  new  accusations, 
but,  as  everything  was  done  to  prevent  such  an  eventuality 
without  power  of  remedy  in  our  hands,  I  dispense  with  dwell 
ing  upon  this  subject.  Would  you  now  please  to  add  to  this 
condition  of  our  fasting  army,  that  the  country,  in  all  directions, 
from  Franklin  was  made  almost  a 'desert,  affording  neither 
forage  nor  food  ;  that  the  roads  were  obstructed  by  the  in 
habitants  and  covered  with  mud,  of  whose  character  no  one. 
who  has  not  seen  that  part  of  country,  can  form  any  conception  ; 
and  I  ask  you,  if  you  or  anybody  else  under  such  circumstances, 
would  have  dared  to  prolong  the  line  of  communication  40 
miles  further,  and  over  mountains,  thus  assuming  the  responsi 
bility  of  the  sure  ruin  of  the  army  ?  There  are  difficulties  and 
situations  in  this  country,  sir,  of  so  peculiar  a  character,  that 
they  will  defeat  every  kind  of  speculation,  if  they  are  not 
taken  into  consideration,  and  the  total  disregard  of  this  particu 
larity  at  your  hands,  is  the  reason  why  you  accumulate  blunders, 
upon  blunders  in  your  critique  upon  this  campaign.  In  order  to 
have  this  fully  evidenced,  and  to  show  how  impracticable  and 
ridiculous  your  critical  interpretations  are,  we  will  perform 
together  the  grand  strategical  movement  towards  Harrison- 
burg,  which  you  undertake  to  make  the  people  believe  is  the 
only  correct  one  we  had  to  execute  with  our  army.  The  first 
result,  by  proceeding  to  Harrisonburg,  will  be  the  prolonga 
tion  of  your  line  of  communication  to  the  length  of  120  miles, 
with  a  means  of  transportation,  which  could  furnish  only  half  a 
ration  for  a  line  of  80  miles,  and  with  an  army  which  suffered 
already  every  kind  of  privation.  As  you  will  observe  by  the 
aid  of  the  map,  the  road  leading  to  Harrisonburg  turns  almost 
perpendicularly  from  our  previous  road,  and  leaves  Franklin  in 
a  corner.  If  you  wish  to  feel  sure  that  your  line  of  communi 
cation,  the  only  line  of  your  vital  power,  will  not  be  cut  in  this 
corner  by  an  attack  from  Stanton,  you  must  leave  a  sufficient 
garrison  at  Franklin,  which,  should  it  be  equal  to  the  probable 


11 

emergency,  would  amount  to  nearly  a  brigade.     In  this  way 
you  divide  your  forces.     Arriving  with- your   main   body  at 
Harrisonburg,  you  propose  to  move   thence  upon  Broadway 
and  New  Market.    Once  more  the  road  crosses  perpendicularly 
your  line  of  communication,  and  a  new  corner  is  left  behind, 
more  dangerous  than  Franklin  ;  being  a  city  of  considerable 
population,  and  accessible  by  nine  different  roads.     I  begin 
now  to  be  very  indifferent,  whether  you  will  secure  your  line  of 
supply  by  leaving   another  garrison  at  Harrisonburg  or  not. 
You  rather  have,  to  say  the  truth,  no  more  supplies,  and  the 
boldness  with  which  you  nevertheless  push  forward  with  a  half- 
starved   army,   has   already   infected   my  brain,   and    like   a 
veteran — of  your  imagining — I  march  with  you  forward  upon 
the  graves  of  my  starved  comrades.     I  don't  care  whether  the 
army  has  already  revolted  or  will  do  so  the  next  moment — I 
don't  know  how  many  have  remained   behind  partly  sick,  or 
starved,  and  partly  deserted.     I  continue  to  advance  with  you 
upon   New  Market.      There,  as  you   suppose,  we   shall  find 
McDowell,  and  "  push  with  him  rapidly  forward,  throwing  out 
cavalry  to  the  right  and  left  near  the  gaps,  to  remain  well 
informed   of  Jackson's    movements."      Should    we    not    find 
McDowell  at  New  Market  or  elsewhere — he,  perhaps,  having 
been  a  little -more  cautious  than  you — 'this  will  not  make  any 
difference  ;  you  are  a  bold  man,  who  always  will  push  rapidly 
forward,  even  should  it  be  on  a  wooden  horse  and  with  the 
shadows  of  the  ruined  army.     Jackson,  that  is  your  strategical 
fancy,  must  at  any  cost  be  prevented  from  returning  South. 
As   such  an  ingenious  and   heroic  strategy  certainly  merits  a 
good  success,  I  am  the  first  to  wish  you  the  most  thorough.     I 
will,  on  this  account,  suppose  that  to  this  very  moment  every 
thing  has  been  going  on  perfectly  well,  and  that,  without  any 
harm  to  you  and  your  troops,  you  fortunately  have  effected  the 
desired  junction  with  McDowell  ;  who,  as  bold  and  aerial  as 
you,  has  fled  over  the  country,  and  reached  the  spot  of  destina 
tion  at  the  fixed  time.    This  being  supposed,  you  have  acquired 
the  strength  of  about  30,000  men,  no  matter  whether  supplied 
or  not ;  and  now  comes  the  glorious   moment  when  you  are 
directly  pushing  forward  against  poor  Jackson,  who,  according 
to  the  horoscope  you  have  cast  for  him,  will  be  prevented  re- 


12 


turning  South,  whatever  course  he  might  take,  as  "  you  always 
can  reach  the  decisive  point  before  him." 

What  a  pity  that  you  cannot  be  as  good  as  the  heroic  words 
in  your  forbearing  book,  and  that  Jackson,  being  as  cunning  a 
fellow  as  you,  gets  in  time  information  of  your  adventurous 
movement,  and  while  you  effect  a  junction  with  McDowell  at 
New  Market,  strikes  from  "Winchester  into  the  road  leading  to 
Petersburg,  seizes  there  your  line  of  communication,  and 
marches  at  his  ease  to  Franklin,  where  he  captures  everything 
left  behind,  and  goes  well  supplied  and  enriched  with  spoils  of 
every  description  triumphantly  to  Stanton,  from  where  he  can 
reach  Richmond  quicker  than  from  Port  Republic. 

How,  sir,  would  you  have  prevented  Jackson  from  doing 
so  after  having  effected  your  fanciful  junction  with  McDowell 
at  New  Market  via  liarrisonsburg  ?  Would  you  have  fol 
lowed  him  through  the  mountains  to  Petersburg,  or  turned 
back  to  Franklin,  to  be  there  before  his  arrival  ?  In  the  first 
case,  you  may  apply  your  favorite  exercise  of  arithmetic,  and 
will  see,  that  whatever  course  you  might  have  taken,  Jackson 
from  Winchester  would  surely  have  reached  the  passes  of  Wor- 
densville  one  or  two  days  before  you,  and  sacrificing  there  in 
the  most  formidable  position  a  very  small  force,  would  have 
contested  your  further  advance  for  days,  while  tus  main  body, 
unmolested  and  with  perfect  ease,  would  have  reached  Peters 
burg  and  Franklin. 

Jn  the  event,  that  you  should  have  intended  to  return  to 
Franklin,  to  be  there  before  Jackson's  arrival,  I  ask  you,  how 
possibly  would  you  have  carried  out  this  new  stratagem.  Being 
still  out  of  breath  with  incessant  marching,  not  having  yet  es 
tablished  a  new  line  of  supplies,  and  having  the  previous  line 
cut  from  New  Creek  to  Franklin,  you  would  have  been,  so  to 
say,  planted  in  the  air.  The  mere  idea,  to  go  under  such  cir 
cumstances  back  to  Franklin,  not  having  anything  to  live  upon, 
and  having  no  prospect  to  get  anything,  would  be  the  most 
gigantic  nonsense.  Fortunately,  this  eventuality  was  based 
upon  the  supposition,  that  you  had  effected  a  junction  with 
McDowell  at  New  Market  via  liarrisonsburg,  and  as  such  a 
manoeuvre  was  only  the  chimeric  offspring  of  an  ill-disposed 
imagination,  with  regard  to  the  real  condition  of  our  troops 


13 

« 

and  supplies  at  Franklin,  we  may  consider  this  excursion  of 
ideas  as  a  mere  experiment  to  show  how  absurd  even  in  this 
case  your  assertion  is,  that  you  would  have  prevented  Jackson 
from  ever  returning  South. 

I  think  there  is  not  much  more  to  be  said  about  your 
strategy.  The  exposure  of  this  example  is  sufficient  to  rank 
you  in  the  category  of  theoretically  overstrained  capacities,  so 
frequently  imported  from  Europe,  who  never  will  assimilate 
with  the  practices  and  the  peculiarities  of  this  country,  and  re 
main  for  their  lifetime  idle  fancy  mongers,  forgetful,  or  igno 
rant,  of  the  fact  that  the  theories  of  European  countries,  grow 
ing  out  of  wars  over  limited  territories,  fall  of  supplies,  with  ex 
cellent  roads,  and  crowded  populations,  do  not  fit  to  America 
with  its  great  extent,  scattered  populations,  bad  roads  and 
limited  supplies. 

Your  entire  deductions  even  from  your  mis-statements,  I 
have  proven  to  be  illogical  and  unmilitary.  They  are  grossly 
absurd  in  view  of  their  entire  untruth.  There  are  still  other 
passages  in  your  book  quite  as  full  of  contradiction  and  ignor 
ance  as  those  already  refuted.  My  business  is  finished  with 
the  discussions  above.  I  will  make  one  other  extract,  however, 
which  is  more  of  a  personal  character,  and  deserves  to  be 
treated  as  such.  It  was  not  germain  to  the  alleged  purpose  of 
your  book,  and  was  entirely  gratuitous.  On  page  176  I  find 
the  following  : 

"  The  action  at  Cross  Keys  is  highly  creditable  to  the  rebel  general,  and 
"  to  his  men  who  fought  it.  The  general,  on  the  contrary,  who  lets  slip 
"  the  opportunity  of  crushing  5,000  men  with  20,000,  and,  what  is  worse, 
"  who  permitted  himself  to  be  beaten  under  such  circumstances,  has  cer- 
"  tainly  but  very  few  claims  to  the  title  of  *  general.'  " 

After  the  irrefutable  evidence  I  have  brought  to  bear  against 
every  single  statement  of  your  lucubrations,  taking  in  consider 
ation  the  time  you  had  to  gather  true  arguments  from  authentic 
sources  before  writing  your  book,  I  feel  justified  in  saying  that, 
although  I  ranked  you  in  the  category  of  idle  fancy  mongers, 
you  this  time  may  not  have  acquired  all  the  nonsense  in  your 
closet,' but  rather  behind  the  il  coulisses,"  where  you  assisted  in 
plotting  a  mean  forgery. 


14: 

To  censure  in  that  manner  a  man  wfio  has  spent  a  life  in  the 
civil  and  military  service  of  the  country,  and  who,  besides  the 
skill  and  energy  he  displayed  in  the  West,  in  this  particular 
campaign  brought  a  striking  example  before  the  country,  of 
what  true  zeal  and  ingenuity  of  a  General  can  perform,  while 
blamelessly  and  most  vigorously  accomplishing  the  chase  of  a 
superior  enemy,  after  overcoming  100  miles  in  seven  days,  and 
every  obstacle  in  his  way, — to  condemn,  I  say,  such  a  man  in 
such  shameless  words,  having  no  other  arguments  for  the  de 
nunciation  than  falsehoods, — this,  sir,  is  nothing  but  a  plain 
villainy,  and  such,  I  am  convinced,  will  be  the  judgment  of 
the  public. 

JOHN  PILSEN,  Lt.-CoL, 
A.  D.  C.  on  General  Fremont's  Staff. 

To  Mr.  EMIL  SCHALK,  Author  of  "  Summary  of  the  Art  of  War," 

Philadelphia,  Pa. 


Stockton,  Calif. 


